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Abstract—This paper combines two important findings from
research on how voters and parties interact: Firstly, it acknowl-
edges that voters possess different decision making mechanisms:
Instead of weighing the parties’ policy promises, they might also
vote based on past performance or the personal qualities of party
leaders. Secondly, it incorporates empirical findings challenging a
prominent device by which party-voter linkages are modeled, i.e.
the left-right scheme. Modern party systems have been shown to
vary in the number of dimensions parties compete on. We model
how voters aggregate issues into party rankings, assuming that
voters switch decision making mechanisms contingent on their
heuristic value, and develop hypotheses on how issue diversity in
party competition influences voter heuristic use. Keywords: Polit-
ical Psychology, Party Competition, Voting Behavior, Heuristics.
I. INTRODUCTION
KEEPING up to date with politics is quite a demandingaim: Besides keeping track of current events, every new
problem that arises can be studied in practically unrestricted
depth. Moreover, the former of these decisions is afflicted with
most citizens not assessing the rewards of political information
too high. In other words: They do not care that much.
Because of that, there has been a lot of research on whether
voters, uninformed as they may be, can make decisions ‘as
if’ they were fully informed [21] [17] [16]. Its fundamental
idea is that they use information shortcuts or heuristics that
summarize information to workable quantities. That means
they neglect certain aspects of the real world, but to a degree
that ‘by and large’ probably does the matter justice.
Examples for these heuristics include voting based on the
retrospective evaluation of candidate performance [9] or the
endorsements of politically significant groups the voter has
a positive affect for [3]. However, the most prominently
discussed information shortcut probably is ideology, i.e. a
broad summarizing device that allows voters to judge how
close a party represents their preferences without having to
learn about each and every issue that is currently politically
salient. It is usually modeled as a continuum on which political
discourse can be mapped, a conception mostly known as the
left-right dimension. It has indeed become the default model
of party competition [8] and has also taken deep root in the
everyday language of politicians and citizens alike.
Accordingly, there is a lot of evidence that voters understand
the left-right scheme well [10] and make ample use of it
[27]. However, there is considerable variation in both of these
aspects across countries as well as time. In countries where
voters have very heterogeneous perceptions of the parties’
left-right position, the correlation between party choice and
left-right positions is weaker [26]. This, we would argue, can
be related to the degree to which parties adhere to the left-
right dimension as the arena of competition: The model’s
performance relies heavily on the assumption that the political
space that voters perceive relates to the space that parties build.
Empirically, this assumption is met imperfectly at best.
Party competition in Europe has become increasingly complex
over time [1], so that today, adherence to unidimensionality
varies widely across party systems [23]. Agent-based models
have tremendously advanced the understanding of party com-
petition in spaces of higher dimensionality (e. g. [20]), but
work remains to be done concerning situations where dimen-
sionality differs between the political supply and demand side.
Here, we try to model how this variation impacts on the
likelihood of voters relying on policy promises as a voting
heuristic. Using a ‘strongly spatial’ model [13] [20, p. 30],
this would be straightforward: If parties compete on more
dimensions than voters can perceive, this adds ‘noise’ to the
‘ideology signal’ and makes it less valuable.
However, acknowledging that dimensions of political con-
flicts are abstractions from the clustering of statements on
different issues [11] and that these clusters need not neces-
sarily be simple reverse images of each other [4], the picture
becomes less clear: On the one hand, if parties compete over
a too diverse set of issues, voters may be less and less able to
extract messages on the issues they actually care about. On the
other hand, the core mechanism of ideology, that is to evaluate
parties only on issues of interest and to ignore ‘clutter’, may
work very well even if the range of topics is very diverse.
Thus, the question we ponder here is how the issue diversity
of party competition influences the decision making of voters.
We study it by combining parties’ capability to ‘sort’ voters by
issues [2] [22] and voters’ tendencies to overlook issues that do
not fit their decision making heuristic [12]. Voters are assumed
to possess different decision heuristics, one of them driven by
party programs, between which they switch according to what
heuristic has the smallest decision costs [7].
This criterion is defined to be fulfilled if the signal that a
heuristic creates as to which party a voter should support is the
strongest possible. Voters in the model assemble an individual
ranking of the parties for each heuristic. Since voting is a
process of choice rather than evaluation [19], voters decide by
that heuristic that produces the greatest distance between the
first and second ranked party, since it most clearly separates
‘the best’ from ‘the rest’.
II. MODEL
The model is executed by running simulations with 1,000
voters each. The simulations consist of an iterative taking-
turns of voters choosing a party to support and parties adapting
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2their program to improve their support share. 1,000 iterations
of these taking-turns are carried out per simulation.1 The key
variables that vary across simulations are the number of issues
I, i.e. the maximum number of topics that can be politically
debated, and the number of parties P that compete in the
system (here, I ranges from 2 to 16 and P from 2 to 8).
A. Voter Behavior
There are three possible attitudes a voter can hold towards
an issue: She can either regard it positively, negatively, or
not care about it. The number of issues a voter cares about,
as well as what preferences she holds concerning it are
chosen at random. Moreover, each voter uses a subset of
I as diagnostic issues that she employs to judge whether a
party conforms to her preferences. This means she may have
preferences on a lot of issues, but does not consider all of
them making a party choice, as is consistent with the ‘fast
and frugal decision making’ model of party choice [19]. The
programmatic preference profile Iv of voter v can therefore
be expressed as a set of categorical variables indicating how
v feels about an issue and whether she employs it to assess
how she feels about a party:
Iv = {i1, ..., iI ; id1, ..., idI} (1)
ij =

1 if pos. issue
0 if does not care
−1 if neg. issue
, idj =
{
1 if diagnostic
0 if not
Feelings about the issues are uniformly distributed across
voters and issues. How many diagnostic issues each voter has
and which these are is determined by the following procedure:
Each voter is randomly assigned a number dv that serves as
the expectation of her number of diagnostic issues to simulate
different degrees of ‘political sophistication’. Which issues
are diagnostic is then determined (contingent on dv) through
random assignment of ‘diagnostic status’ by use of three
different ‘correlation profiles’ (see Fig. 1). In the first of these
profiles, each issue has the same probability of being used as
a diagnostic tool. In the second (third) profile, probabilities
are shifted such that the first issue, compared to the uniform
distribution, is 1.25 (1.5) times likelier to be diagnostic; the
respective multiplier for the last issue is 0.75 (0.5). In between,
the probability decreases linearly. This enables incorporating
the effects of different degrees of correlation across voters with
regard to their diagnostic issues in the model.
When making up their mind about which party to support,
voters observe what each party has to say on their diagnostic
issues. Specifically, they use the saliency of an issue in a
party’s program, measured by the share that statements on the
issue occupy among all of the party’s statements, spiSp , to judge
how much a party advocates the issues they care most about
1A ‘burn-in’ phase of 100 iterations was included in which voters only
decide on programmatic basis, without switching. Also, parties ignore issue
ownership in this phase (see below) to allow for ‘political debate’ to develop.
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Fig. 1. Examplary probability profiles for assignment of diagnostic issues
with I = 8 and a voter with dv = 4.
(the process of how parties ‘make statements’ is elaborated on
below). The score a voter assigns to a party is computed as
Vpv =
I∑
j=1
iji
d
j
spj
Sp
, (2)
which means a party is punished for statements the voter does
not like to hear (ij = −1) and rewarded for views the voter
agrees with (ij = 1). Voters produce a ranking of parties
based on these scores. However, there is a second, exogenously
given parameter by which they rank parties referred to as
‘Likability’ (Lpv) here. It is randomly chosen from a uniform
distribution and can be interpreted as either of the other
voting heuristics established in electoral research, such as the
candidate appearance heuristic [18], retrospective voting [9],
or as a residual category of ‘all others’.
As mentioned earlier, voters use that heuristic producing
the ranking with the maximal distance between the first and
second best party. This is not to say that heuristic choice is
a deliberate decision made by the voter, but it is modeled in
that fashion for the sake of explicitness [15]. More precisely,
a voter supports a party p∗ if
Vp∗v =max
p
[Vpv] and Vp∗v −max
p 6=p∗
[Vpv] > Lp′v −max
p 6=p′
[Lpv],
where Lp′v = max
p
[Lpv], or if (3)
Lp∗v =max
p
[Lpv] and Lp∗v −max
p 6=p∗
[Lpv] ≥ Vp′v −max
p 6=p′
[Vpv],
where Vp′v = max
p
[Vpv]. (4)
Voter behavior as a whole can thus be summarized as
follows: In each iteration (i) compute the programmatic score
Vpv of each party according to its updated issue statements
and (ii) compare the ranking of the parties on basis of
programmatic scores to that on basis of likings Lpv . Use that
ranking as voting heuristic that produces the clearest ‘winner’
and (iii) declare support for said winner.
B. Party Behavior
In the model, parties select issues they do or do not empha-
size on grounds of the image they have of voter preferences
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3and whether other parties have already taken up these issues.
They do not know how voters process political debate into
their choice of party support, but concentrate on the issue
that is currently on the agenda: One issue its ∈ I and one
party pts ∈ P are randomly selected at the beginning of each
iteration t; its could for example be interpreted as a topic
gaining acute media coverage that pts is expected to react to.
pts now faces a choice between emphasizing the issue in
its program or keeping quiet about it. Since parties ultimately
need to gather electoral support to gain access to both the
spoils of office and the ability to implement policies, we
assume that they emphasize issues that they think are seen
positively by a majority of voters and keep quiet about those
that they think most voters see negatively or are not interested
in. To gather information about which is the case, pts “polls” a
subset of voters at the begininng of its turn.2 While the fact that
parties cannot influence what the ‘issue of the day’ is probably
does not do the reality of party competition full justice (see
[6]), it seems to be a reasonable approximation of modern
political campaigns, where parties try to find appropriate
reactions to issues the salience of which they can often not
control. It also appears to be most consistent with the ‘issue-
based’ theories of party competition this model rests on.
The party concludes that the issue is ‘relevant’ if those who
regard the issue positively make up 34 percent or more of the
polled voters and outnumber those who regard it negatively
(this threshold is chosen since it is just above the expected
value for the share of voters in favor of the issue). In that case,
it makes a statement on the topic (i.e. it increases spj by 5 or
10, depending on model specification); otherwise it remains
quiet (does nothing). Note that this means that a party cannot
‘take back’ statements should its first idea about an issue’s
popularity turn out to be wrong.
One additional behavioral rule that parties have is that they
take into account ‘Issue Ownership’, a concept which lies at
the core of issue-driven theories of party competition [4] [5]:
Each party wants to be associated with specific issues by the
electorate to appear as the party with the most expertise in
this field. Analogously, parties do not want to emphasize issues
that are already ‘owned’ by others, because that is expected to
benefit the issue’s ‘owner’ more than themselves. Therefore, in
the model, parties do not make statements on an issue i if for
any other party p, spiSp is larger than the ‘ownership threshold’.
The simulations were run with this threshold at 0.2, 0.5 and
1 (= no issue ownership) to be able to control for any efffects
it might have on voter decision-making.
Party behavior, once the issue and party ‘of the day’ are
chosen, can thus be summarized in the following way: (i) Poll
a subset of the electorate on their preferences regarding the
2Of course, this is not to say that an actual poll is conducted, but rather
that party leaders, through the party’s member base, citizen appeals etc. have
some kind of ‘hunch’ what voters think about an issue. This hunch is obviously
likely to be biased towards the preferences of voters that already support the
party. Since this bias cannot be quantified, the simulations were carried out
both with the parties drawing representative samples of the electorate and them
tending only to their own supporters’ preferences, which turns the model into
a kind of sorting model similar to that of Tiebout [25] (also see [14]). This
should provide for appropriate benchmarks, although the actual bias remains
unknown.
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Fig. 2. Predicted share of voters using party programs as a voting heuristic,
by number of parties and issues.
currently salient issue its; (ii) if a sufficiently large share of
the polled voters has a positive view of the issue and if the
issue is not ‘owned’ by another party, emphasize this issue
(increase spj).
III. RESULTS
Fig. 2 gives an overview of the model’s dynamics by indi-
cating the average share of voters who are in ‘programmatic
voting mode’ at the end of each simulation across the number
of issues I and the number of parties P used. It suggests
that voters have a higher probability to use their diagnostic
issues as decision heuristic the more parties compete in a
system. This is intuitively plausible: More parties should
ceteris paribus cater to more specific preference profiles and
make it easier for a voter to find ‘her’ party. Likewise, more
issues also increase the share of programmatic voters. This
seems to mean rather than confusing voters, a more diverse
range of topics induces them to vote based on party programs
more often.3
Table I provides further insight into the matter: It shows the
results of several logistic regression analyses estimating the
probability of a simulated voter to be in programmatic voting
mode. To compute these, the ‘virtual electorates’ produced
in the simulations are pooled into one data set. This allows
using the numbers of both parties and issues, as well as the
degree of correlation of diagnostic issues in the electorate, as
macro level predictors. Furthermore, the analysis controls for
the ownership threshold and the amount by which parties in-
crement spj when making a statement. Additionally, individual
characteristics of the simulated voters are controlled for, i.e. (i)
the number of issues used as diagnostic as a share of all issues
and (ii) the number of issues a voter sees either positively or
negatively (but is not indifferent about; also divided by I).
The results support the previously stated: An increase in
the numbers of parties and issues both lead to an increased
probability of programmatic voting on the voters’ side. The
same is true if voters increasingly use the same issues as
diagnostic issues, as is reflected by the coefficients of dummy
3Graphs for subsamples defined by polling mode, ownership threshold and
amount of increment when making an issue statement (available on request)
show differences in the level of programmatic voting, but the general pattern
remains.
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4TABLE I
MICRO-LEVEL EXAMINATION OF SIMULATION RESULTS
Variables 1 2 3
Coeff. (se) Coeff. (se) Coeff. (se)
No. of Issues 0.063*** 0.045*** -0.060***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
No. of Parties 0.159*** 0.159*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Diagnostic Issues 1.842*** 1.589*** 1.536***
(Ratio) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
Preference Issues 1.812*** 1.815*** 1.824***
(Ratio) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Diag. Iss. * Issues 0.029*** 0.036***
(0.001) (0.001)
Parties * Issues 0.020***
(0.000)
Med. idj Correlation 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.037***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
High idj Correlation 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.100***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Issue Increment = 10 -0.007** -0.007** -0.007**
Reference: 5 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ownership Threshold=0.2 0.469*** 0.469*** 0.472***
Ref.: no ownership (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ownership Threshold=0.5 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.094***
Ref.: no ownership (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
‘Tiebout polling’ 1.228*** 1.229*** 1.236***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -5.315*** -5.151*** -4.222***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Logistic Regression, DV: Programmatic Voting Mode (***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01)
variables indicating the different correlation profiles depicted
in fig. 1. Issue ownership generally increases the probability
of programmatic voting, more so as parties find it easier to
claim an issue as theirs (i.e., the threshold for spiSp decreases).
The coefficients on ‘polling mode’ (see ftn. 2) and ‘issue
increment’ suggest an interesting pattern with regard to party
responsiveness, implying that programmatic voting should be
most prevalent if parties primarily respond to their followers
(as opposed to the electorate as a whole) and make not too
large adjustments of their program.
On the micro level, the probabibility of programmatic voting
is increased if a voter uses a higher share of the overall
issues as diagnostic issues. This is consistent with the well
established empirical finding that more ‘sophisticated’ voters
are better able to use ideology as a heuristic [24] [16]. A rather
interesting finding is that voters who have preferences (i.e.
ij 6= 0) on a higher share of issues have a higher probability
of programmatic voting although these issues may not even
be used in the programmatic assessment of parties.
Model 3 qualifies our findings regarding the numbers of
parties and issues in an interesting way: The interaction effects
included there suggest that in an environment with relatively
few parties, greater issue diversity can make the parties’
programs less available as a choice heuristic. When accounting
for this interaction, that also extends to voters who consider
fewer issues when making their minds up about the parties.
IV. ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Earlier versions of this work were discussed at the SO-
CLIFE Spring workshop 2014 and the CCCP Research Semi-
nar. We also thank Andre´ Kaiser, Clemens Kroneberg, Simon
Lessenich and the two anonymous reviewers for valuable
comments.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Albright. The multidimensional nature of party competition. Party
Politics, 16(6):699–719, 2010.
[2] D. Baldassarri and A. Gelman. Partisans without constraint: Political
polarization and trends in American public opinion. American Journal
of Sociology, 114(2):408–446, 2008.
[3] H. E. Brady and P. M. Sniderman. Attitude attribution: A group basis
for political reasoning. American Political Science Review, 79(4):1061–
1078, 1985.
[4] I. Budge and D. Farlie. Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue
Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies. Allen &
Unwin, London, 1983.
[5] I. Budge, H. D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, and E. Tanenbaum.
Mapping policy preferences I: estimates for parties, electors, and
governments, 1945-1998. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.
[6] E. Carmines and J. Stimson. On the structure and sequence of issue
evolution. American Political Science Review, 80(3):901–920, 1986.
[7] N. D’Amico. Product of our environment: The effect of institutions on
the use of voting heuristics. Unpublished Manuscript, 2013.
[8] A. Downs. An economic theory of democracy. Harper and Row, New
York, 1957.
[9] M. Fiorina. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. Yale
University Press, 1981.
[10] S. Franzmann. The Change of Ideology: How the Left-Right Cleavage
transforms into Issue Competition. PhD. Thesis. Cologne, 2009.
[11] S. Franzmann. Towards a real comparison of left-right indices: A com-
ment on Jahn. Party Politics, 2013. doi: 10.1177/1354068813499865.
[12] G. Gigerenzer. Der eindimensionale Wa¨hler. Zeitschrift fu¨r Sozialpsy-
chologie, 13:217–236, 1982.
[13] M. Humphreys and M. Laver. Spatial models, cognitive metrics, and
majority rule equilibria. British Journal of Political Science, 40:11–30,
2010.
[14] K. Kollman, J. Miller, and S. Page. Political institutions and sorting in
a Tiebout model. American Economic Review, 87(5):977–992, 1997.
[15] C. Kroneberg. Die Definition der Situation und die variable Rationalita¨t
der Akteure. Ein allgemeines Modell des Handelns. Zeitschrift fu¨r
Soziologie, 35(5):344–363, 2005.
[16] R. R. Lau, D. J. Andersen, and D. P. Redlawsk. An exploration of
correct voting in recent U.S. presidential elections. American Journal
of Political Science, 52(2):395–411, 2008.
[17] R. R. Lau and D. P. Redlawsk. Voting correctly. American Political
Science Review, 91(3):585–598, 1997.
[18] R. R. Lau and D. P. Redlawsk. Advantages and disadvantages of
cognitive heuristics in political decision making. American Journal of
Political Science, 45(4):951–971, 2001.
[19] R. R. Lau and D. P. Redlawsk. How voters decide : Information
processing during election campaigns. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2006. reprint of 2011.
[20] M. Laver and E. Sergenti. Party Competition: An Agent-Based Model.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2012.
[21] A. Lupia. Shortcuts versus encyclopedias: Information and voting
behavior in California insurance reform elections. American Political
Science Review, pages 63–76, 1994.
[22] A. McGann. Why unidimensionality: Party systems as constraints on
choice. Paper Prepared for the Annual Conference of the MPSA, 2008.
[23] J. Rovny and E. E. Edwards. Struggle over dimensionality: Party
competition in Western and Eastern Europe. East European Politics
& Societies, 26(1):56–74, 2012.
[24] P. Sniderman, R. Brody, and P. Tetlock. Reasoning and Choice:
Explorations in Political Psychology. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1991.
[25] C. M. Tiebout. A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political
Economy, 64(5):416–424, 1956.
[26] C. Van der Eijk, M. Franklin, and W. Van der Brug. Policy preferences
and party choice. In J. Thomassen and H. Schmitt, editors, Political
Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union, pages 161–181.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.
[27] C. Van der Eijk, H. Schmitt, and T. Binder. Left-right orientations
and party choice. In J. Thomassen, editor, The European Voter: A
comparative study of modern democracies. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2005.
Miguel, Amblard, Barceló & Madella (eds.) Advances in Computational Social Science and Social Simulation
Barcelona: Autònoma University of Barcelona, 2014, DDD repository <http://ddd.uab.cat/record/125597>
